Understanding passive and active service discovery by Genevieve Bartlett et al.
Understanding Passive and Active Service Discovery (Extended)
ISI-TR-642, May 30, 2007
Genevieve Bartlett† John Heidemann† Christos Papadopoulos‡
†USC/Information Sciences Institute ‡Colorado State University
{bartlett,johnh,fabio}@isi.edu christos@cs.colostate.edu
Abstract
Increasingly, network operators do not directly operate
computers on their network, yet are responsible for assessing
network vulnerabilities to ensure compliance with laws and
policies about information disclosure, and tracking services
that affect provisioning. Thus, with decentralized network
management, service discovery becomes an important part
of maintaining and protecting computer networks.
We explore two approaches to service discovery: active
probing and passive monitoring. Active probing ﬁnds all ser-
vices currently on the network, except services temporarily
unavailable or hidden by ﬁrewalls; however, it is often too
invasive, especially if used across administrative boundaries.
Passive monitoring is typically much slower and can ﬁnd
transient services, but misses services that are idle. We com-
pare the accuracy of passive and active approaches to service
discovery and show that they are complimentary, highlight-
ing the need for multiple active scans coupled with long-
duration passive monitoring. We ﬁnd passive monitoring
is well suited for quickly ﬁnding popular services, ﬁnding
servers responsible for 99% of incoming connections within
minutes. Active scanning is better suited to rapidly ﬁnding
all servers, which is important for vulnerability detection–
one scan ﬁnds 98% of services in two hours, missing only
a handful. External scans are an unexpected ally to passive
monitoring, speeding service discovery by the equivalent of
9–15 days of additional observation. Finally, we show how
the use of static or dynamic addresses changes the effective-
ness of service discovery, both due to address reuse and VPN
effects.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Net-
work Operations—Network monitoring
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1 Introduction
Today’s computer networks support very diverse sets of
services, and network administrators must manage and pro-
tect an organization’s network from vulnerability and in-
appropriate information disclosure. In small organizations,
externally visible computers and services may be centrally
managed, but in large organizations and ISPs control of
servers is delegated. Yet, the ultimate responsibility for se-
curity and auditing may remain centralized, so in these cases
service discovery becomes an important part of maintaining
and protecting such networks.
Service discovery is an essential capability for network
administrators for the following reasons. First, it helps pro-
tect against software vulnerabilities. Internet worms and bot-
net sweeps exploit vulnerabilities in open network services.
Rapid identiﬁcation of vulnerable software is important after
disclosure of an exploit; preemptive surveys can track an or-
ganization’s service “surface area”. Second, most organiza-
tions have policies about computer use, often including what
external services may be offered. Service discovery supports
auditing of policies. Third, service discovery is often the ﬁrst
step in network planning. Understanding what services are
in use can identify who and how many users will be affected
by a change in policy or conﬁguration. Finally, service dis-
covery can also help monitor trends in service popularity, as
new services appear and the relative importance of services
change.
Even if one cannot control individual hosts, access to the
network allows two general methods to discover services:
active probing and passive monitoring. With active probing,
one attempts to contact each service at each host. Active
probing gives an accurate depiction of all open and available
servicesonanetworkatthetimeoftheprobe, butitmaymiss
services which are only available intermittently or are hidden
behind by ﬁrewalls. In addition, probing is invasive and may
be inappropriate when crossing organization boundaries (for
example, an ISP probing its customers).
In passive monitoring, one observes network trafﬁc des-
tined to servers, building up a picture of active services overtime. Passive monitoring will detect all services that are ex-
ercised over the observation period, including transient ser-
vices and those behind ﬁrewalls. Since it is non-invasive,
passive monitoring cannot be confused with malicious be-
havior. However, it misses services which are idle, even
though they may still represent a vulnerability.
In this paper we present a quantitative evaluation and
comparison of passive monitoring and active probing for ser-
vice discovery based on data collected at the University of
Southern California. Although these approaches have been
compared qualitatively in IT trade magazines [16] there has
been little quantitative exploration. Our comparison of pas-
sive and active service discovery is closer to Webster [20],
but goes deeper by evaluating multiple periodic active scans
(Section 4.2.3) and the effects of transient hosts and exter-
nal scans (Sections 4.4.2 and 4.3). Additionally, we investi-
gate the sensitivity of passive/active discovery to time of day,
monitor location and portion of trafﬁc seen by the monitor
(Section 5). Finally, using a larger and more varied popula-
tion we conﬁrm the core conclusion in Webster [20]: passive
and active are effective and often complimentary means of
service discovery.
We ﬁnd passive monitoring is well suited for quickly ﬁnd-
ing popular services, such as for trend monitoring; within
minutes passive monitoring ﬁnds servers responsible for
serving 99% of incoming connections. We ﬁnd that active
scanning is better suited to ﬁnding all servers, such as for
vulnerability detection; one scan ﬁnds 98% of services in
two hours, missing only a handful.
In addition, we look carefully at what network condi-
tions affect the completeness of active and passive service
detection. On our network, long-duration passive monitor-
ing is ultimately reasonably successful at ﬁnding even idle
servers (ﬁnding 72–91%); perhaps ironically, external, pos-
sibly malicious scans of our network, provide great assis-
tance in rapidly detecting services. We also show how the
use of static vs. dynamic addresses changes the effectiveness
of service discovery. We see a great deal of ongoing service
discovery with more dynamic addresses, corresponding to
transient hosts that possibly reuse addresses. In addition, we
show that services on VPN addresses are almost never dis-
covered passively, but are found with active probing.
Thistechnicalreportisanextendedversionofapapercur-
rently under review (as of May 2007). Sections 5.4 and 5.5
are new in this report.
2 Overview of Service Discovery Techniques
We next describe brieﬂy how active probing and passive
monitoring are used to discover services, and review the
trade-offs between these approaches.
2.1 Active Probing
Active probing ﬁnds services by sending packets to each
host and monitoring its response. Active probing requires
participation of the host running the service, so results can
be affected by ﬁrewalls or host counter-measures. To dis-
cover available services hosts are scanned by probing all
target ports on each host on the network. Probes may be
generic (speciﬁc only to the protocol, not the application), or
customized to an expected application. Host discovery can
speed service discovery by checking for host presence and
skipping unused addresses.
For some services, a probe may need to be speciﬁc to a
given application. However, given TCP’s connection setup,
for TCP services simply initiating a connection is a generic
probe that will detect the presence of a server on a well-
known port. This process of discovering TCP services is
known as half-open scanning, where the prober attempts to
set up a new TCP connection to a given port. A successful
response indicates an active server is running. Other possi-
ble responses include a TCP reset message, conﬁrming no
service runs on that port. or lack of response, suggesting a
ﬁrewall.
Generic TCP probing is insufﬁcient, however, in two
cases. First, it only tests for willingness to open a TCP con-
nection, but not what service that connection supports. It
will therefore misinterpret services running on non-standard
ports, such as a web server running on the standard SMTP
port. Second, it cannot classify servers that have no stan-
dard port, or those that use dynamic port assignment. For ex-
ample, many RPC protocols allocate TCP ports dynamically
and discover allocation through service brokers or portmap-
pers (for example, [5,15,18]). To discover these services an
active probe must be speciﬁcally designed for that service’s
protocol. Nevertheless, use of well known ports is common
today, and a necessary means of coordination without a third
party.
Though generic UDP probing gives ambiguous results,
such probing is still possible for well-known UDP services.
Certain protocols will respond to a “malformed” UDP packet
and hence will respond to a generic UDP probe. In other
cases, we can indirectly infer the presence of a UDP ser-
vice by lack of a negative response, since many hosts auto-
matically generate ICMP port unreachable messages when
no process is listening to a given UDP port. A lack of re-
sponse is not deﬁnitive, but may indicate that a UDP server
is present.
In the majority of our study we focus on TCP services,
but delve brieﬂy into UDP service discovery in Section 4.5.
2.2 Passive Monitoring
Passive monitoring ﬁnds services on a network by observ-
ing trafﬁc generated by servers and clients as it passes an ob-
servation point and is generally invisible to the hosts running
the services.
Passive monitoring requires support from the network op-
erator, often with specialized hardware inserted at the mon-
itoring point. There are multiple hardware devices available
for passive monitoring, with different costs and tolerance of
high trafﬁc volumes. Many routers can “mirror” ports, send-
ing copies of packets out another interface to a monitoring
host. Port mirroring can often be added with no interruption
to service, but may not support full channel capacity. Al-
ternatively, hardware taps such as optical splitters place no
additional burden on the router, but require a brief service
interruption to install.
Detection of well-known services (both TCP and UDP)
with passive monitoring is fairly straightforward. An ex-
change of trafﬁc with a given host indicates an operationalservice. ForTCP,monitoringneedonlycaptureTCPconnec-
tion setup messages (SYN bit set); completion of the “three-
way handshake” clearly indicates a service is available. Un-
der normal operation, even just the presence of a positive
response to a connection request (SYN-ACK) is sufﬁcient
evidence of a TCP service.
UDP services can also be identiﬁed by observing trafﬁc;
however, since UDP is a connectionless protocol, the con-
cept of “server” and “client” is not clear without application
protocol information. In addition, while bi-directional traf-
ﬁc positively indicates a UDP service, unidirectional trafﬁc
may also indicate a service (since UDP does not mandate a
response), but may also indicate unsolicited probe trafﬁc.
As with active probing, passive monitoring can not iden-
tify services that do not run on well-known ports or are indi-
rected without protocol-speciﬁc decoders.
2.3 Discussion
Based on the descriptions of active and passive service
discovery above, we next compare their advantages and dis-
advantages.
With few exceptions, active probing gives a complete re-
port of all ports that are open and unprotected at the time
of the probing. Active probing for services will miss ports
that are ﬁltered by ﬁrewalls or obscured by mechanisms such
as port knocking [11]. Arguably, protected services are less
likely to be vulnerable to malicious scanning and/or unso-
licited attacks, so detection of such services is less critical
for vulnerability assessment. However, for goals of auditing
and resource planning, discovery of all (including protected)
services is important.
Active probing can often be done quite quickly. While
probes consume some bandwidth, scanners can be placed
near the probed hosts where bandwidth is plentiful.
The main disadvantage of active probing is that it is very
intrusive. Active probes solicit a response that would not
have been sent otherwise. This can be detected and logged
by the host or intrusion detection systems, particularly if one
systematically scans all hosts in a region. Scanning across
organizations (such as an ISP scanning its customers) may
be considered unacceptable by the customers and may even
be illegal. Recognizing these concerns, scanning tools such
as Nmap support special scanning modes that intentionally
slow their probe rate to conceal their behavior. Scanning is
often intentionally avoided as a policy decision out of regard
for client privacy. When active probing is used, it is often
limited to short probes done relatively infrequently, or per-
haps only carried out when motivated by a speciﬁc vulnera-
bility.
A second disadvantage of active scanning is that it misses
hosts that may be temporarily unavailable at the time of scan.
We quantify this effect in Section 4.1, and in fact show that
the time of day of the scan matters (Section 5.1). This dis-
advantage can be mitigated with multiple active scans, as we
show in Section 4.2.3, although additional scans my draw
further notice from those operating the scanned hosts.
Passive monitoring has the advantage of being non-
intrusive. In fact, it generally cannot be detected by either
party of a conversation. As a result, use of passive monitor-
ing is constrained primarily by policy decisions by the net-
work operator. A second advantage of passive monitoring is
that it can better detect active services running on transient
hosts. Thus, vulnerabilities on machines that are frequently
powered off such as laptops, or hosts temporarily discon-
nected from the network, all may be found. While it may
seem surprising that one may run services on hosts that are
intermittently available, we see that this effect can be signif-
icant in Section 4.4.2. Third, passive monitoring can catch
services that active probing misses because of ﬁrewall con-
ﬁgurations.
Fourth, although not a primary focus of this paper, pas-
sive monitoring can also provide insight into trends and other
behaviors which active probing cannot. While monitoring
servers, passive monitoring can also track clients, providing
extra information such as server popularity and server load.
Finally, since passive monitoring consumes no network
resources (other than the monitoring host), it can be run on a
long-term basis as part of normal operation.
The main disadvantage of passive monitoring is that it
only detects services that are active. Silent servers therefore
escape notice, even though they may still pose vulnerabili-
ties or policy violations. We quantify the number of these
silent servers in Section 4.4.1 by using active probes to dis-
coverserverswhichescapenoticeduringpassivemonitoring.
This disadvantage can be somewhat mitigated by long-term
monitoring. We quantify the effect of duration of passive
monitoring in Section 4.2.1.
3 Methodology and Datasets
To compare passive monitoring with active probing we
carried out ﬁve experiments in 2006 for periods of up to 90
days as shown in Table 1. We next describe our data col-
lection and give details on our experiments. The data was
collected at the University of Southern California, with a stu-
dent population of about 28,000 and faculty and staff adding
another 10,500. We describe this population in more detail
in Section 3.3.
3.1 Methodology for Active Probing
Our active scans were performed by the staff of our cam-
pus network administration using Nmap [2]. Probing was
done from internal campus machines, thus both the probes
and the responses were invisible to our passive monitoring.
For larger experiments (Datasets DTCP1 and DTCPbreak), an
address space of 16,130 IP addresses was split roughly in
half and scanned separately by two internal machines. For
smaller experiments, scanning was performed from a single
internal machine. All IP addresses in the scanned space were
probed (there was no separate phase for host discovery). For
our larger datasets, probing took one to two hours to com-
plete. Scans used Nmap’s half-open scanning mode.
We focus on a set of standard TCP service ports: port
21 (FTP), 22 (SSH), 80 (web), 443 (SSL web) and 3306
(MySQL). We have chosen a small set of standard ports for
simplicity and out of privacy concerns. We believe that our
results hold for other services that use well-known ports, and
we examine this claim in Section 5.4.
To complement discovery of TCP-based services, one
dataset(DatasetDUDP)usesNmap’sgenericUDPprobingto
probe a set of four standard UDP ports: 80 (HTTP and otherapplications), 53 (DNS), 137 (Microsoft Windows NetBIOS
Name Service) and 27015 (common multiplayer game port).
We discuss results from our UDP scans in Section 4.5.
3.2 Methodology for Passive Monitoring
Our passive measurements are collected at the regional
ISP serving our university as well as other academic and
commercial institutions. Based on discussions with our IT
staff, we estimate we capture over 99% of non-Internet2 traf-
ﬁc to and from the university. (In section 5.2, we investi-
gate how adding monitoring of Internet2 trafﬁc affects our
results.) We used a continuous network tracing infrastruc-
ture [10] and collected all TCP SYN, SYN-ACK and RST
packets, as well as all UDP trafﬁc.
To discover available TCP services, we assume that any
host sending a SYN-ACK is running a service. TCP SYNs
and RSTs are used in Section 4.3 to identify external hosts,
which scan the university network. To discover available
UDP services, we assume that any host which sends UDP
trafﬁc from a well known server port is running a UDP ser-
vice on that port.
3.3 Datasets
Using the methodology described above, we collected
ﬁve datasets summarized in Table 1. Each dataset has an ac-
tive and a passive component: data from continuous passive
monitoring and data from one or more active scans. Each
dataset contains information for a set of IP addresses from
one or more subnetworks on our campus. The total number
of possible IP addresses in each set is listed in column six of
Table 1.
Seven of our datasets cover 38 of the most densely pop-
ulated subnetworks on campus. Together, these 38 subnets
contain 16,130 IP addresses. Roughly 75 % of this address
space has assigned host names, and over 60% of the IP ad-
dresses we probed during our study responded with at least
one TCP RST and/or TCP SYN–ACK, indicating at least
6,450 of the 16,130 IP addresses are assigned to live hosts.
Our main dataset, DTCP1-18d, is an 18-day period with
concurrent active probes every 12 hours and passive collec-
tion over the entire period. The dataset is actually a subset
of the longer DTCP1 dataset, which includes 90 days of pas-
sive monitoring, but we only have active measurements for
18 days, captured in DTCP1-18d. We use the full 90-day ver-
sion to study very long duration passive monitoring in Sec-
tion 4.2.2. We also use the ﬁrst 12-hours of DTCP1-18d for
our preliminary analysis and DTCP1-18d-trans, the set of “tran-
sient” addresses of DTCP1-18d in Section 4.4.2 to discover
transient hosts.
Dataset DTCP1 was taken during a the semester when stu-
dents, faculty and staff are present. Dataset DTCPbreak com-
pliments DTCP1 with a similar duration, but was taken during
the December break in classes when many students are ab-
sent from campus, giving insight into how our results change
with a reduced number of users.
Dataset DTCPall is used for a brief study in looking at ser-
vices offered on any port, not just a selected set of ports (dis-
cussed in Section 5.4). Dataset DUDP is used for a brief ex-
ploration into UDP service discovery and covers a selected
set of 4 UDP ports (discussed in Section 4.5).
Due to privacy concerns both passive and active results
are anonymized after collection, and all processing was done
on anonymized traces. The anonymized datasets are avail-
able through the PREDICT project [19] or by contacting the
authors.
4 Evaluation of Service Discovery
We next evaluate passive and active approaches to service
discovery, considering completeness (Section 4.1), the im-
portance of observation time, repeated probing, and external
scans on completeness (Section 4.2 and 4.3), and ﬁnally how
the type of the target computer and service affects accuracy
(Section 4.4).
4.1 Completeness
Our ﬁrst goal is to evaluate completeness: how closely
active or passive detection comes to detecting everything. To
answer this question we ﬁrst deﬁne ground truth and explore
how close we come todetecting allservers. We then consider
other deﬁnitions of completeness, such as all connections or
all trafﬁc.
4.1.1 Hosts as Ground Truth
We ﬁrst establish the effectiveness of both methods. We
look at the servers discovered by active and passive methods
during a brief survey and compare the completeness each
method achieves. For this comparison, we use the ﬁrst 12-
hours of passively collected data and the ﬁrst active scan
from dataset DTCP1-18d. We call this subset DTCP1-12h. It
makes up 3% of dataset DTCP1-18d; we expand to consider
all data in DTCP1-18d in Section 4.2.1.
To compare passive and active methods we must ﬁrst de-
ﬁne ground truth. Ideally we would get ground truth by
conﬁrming, externally, what services run on each machine.
However, we cannot do this for our dataset since it spans
a signiﬁcant portion of a university with hundreds of sep-
arately administered groups and thousands of privately run
machines. Instead, we deﬁne ground truth as the union of
servers found by passive and active methods.
While we expect that passive monitoring will not give as
complete a picture as active probing, we also expect pas-
sive monitoring to ﬁnd a number of services active probing
misses.
The leftmost column of Table 2 summarizes server dis-
covery for each method as well as the union and overlap of
the two methods. Combined, both methods ﬁnd 1,748 hosts
running one or more service of interest. Treating these 1,748
as the ground truth for completeness, a single network scan
discovers 98% of all servers by detecting 1,707 hosts. Pas-
sive monitoring for 12-hours achieves only 19% complete-
ness by detecting 327 servers. Given the large percentage of
hosts missed, it is clear that passive monitoring by itself is
not sufﬁcient for situations when one must rapidly ﬁnd all
servers that meet a given criteria, such as doing a vulnerabil-
ity scan immediately following the disclosure of a software
ﬂaw.
While Table 2 quantiﬁes the overlap and completeness of
passive and active methods, Table 3 gives context to these
numbers by interpreting each combination of observations.
For example, because 286 servers were found by both meth-
ods, we know that 16% of servers found in dataset DTCP1-12hDataset Passive Active Target Number Discussion
Name Start Date Duration Scans Services of addresses Section
DTCP1 10 Aug. 2006 90 days 35 total TCP/selected 16,130 Section 4.4.2
DTCP1-12h 19 Sept. 2006 12 hours once TCP/selected 16,130 Section 4
DTCP1-18d 19 Sept. 2006 18 days every 12 hrs TCP/selected 16,130 Section 4
DTCP1-18d-trans 19 Sept. 2006 18 days every 12 hrs TCP/selected 2,296 Section 4.4.2
DTCP1-90d 10 Aug. 2006 90 days - TCP/selected 16,130 Section 4.2.2
DTCPbreak 16 Dec. 2006 11 days every 12 hrs TCP/selected 16,130 Section 5.2
DTCPall 26 Aug. 2006 10 days once TCP/all 256 Section 4.5
DUDP 18 Oct. 2006 1 day once UDP/selected 16,130 Section 4.5
Table 1: List of datasets. DTCP1-12h and DTCP1-18d are subsets of DTCP1.
Percent of DTCP1-18d used 3% 6% 50% 100%
Passive duration in hours 12 25 205 410
Number of active scans 1 2 17 35
Total servers found (union) 1,748 (100%) 1,848 (100%) 2,551 (100%) 2,960 (100%)
Passive AND Active 286 (16%) 1,074(58%) 1,738 (68%) 1,925 (65%)
Active OR Passive (but not both)
Active only 1,421 (81%) 716 (39%) 683 (27%) 848 (29%)
Passive only 41 (2.3%) 58(3.1%) 130 (5.0%) 186 (6.3%)
Active 1,707 (98%) 1,790 (92%) 2,421 (95%) 2,773 (94%)
Passive 327 (19%) 1,132 (61%) 1,868 (73%) 2,111 (71%)
Table 2: Summary of completeness for active and passive methods at various duration using dataset DTCP1-18d
are open and active servers, while the vast majorityof servers
(81%) are idle.
Despite the power of active probing, passive monitoring
ﬁnds 41 servers (2.3%) active probing fails to detect. Ac-
tive may have missed these servers because the servers were
born after the active scan completed, or these servers may
be protected by a ﬁrewall that discards our active probes,
while accepting requests from other IP addresses. We look
closer at ﬁrewalled services and server birth in Section 4.2.1.
While 2% is a very small percentage of services found exclu-
sively by passive monitoring, ﬁnding these few services may
be valuable if, for example, one of these services violates
policy. In cases where completeness is key, a combination of
both methods is advantageous.
4.1.2 Other Measures of Completeness
In the last section we looked at completeness in terms of
absolute number of servers found. While ﬁnding all servers
is important in some cases, such as identifying software vul-
nerabilities, in other cases one may care more about identi-
fying popular or active services. We therefore next consider
two alternate deﬁnitions of completeness that weigh service
discovery by their popularity, as reﬂected by the number of
clients and the number of ﬂows to a given service.
First, we weigh by unique clients, by counting the num-
ber of unique client IP addresses that connect to the server
during the duration of our measurements. When we ﬁrst dis-
cover a server, we add the number of clients this IP address
serves throughout the study. Thus, if there were only servers
A and B to be discovered, with 9 and 1 clients over the traced
duration respectively, we would discover 90% of the client-
weighted servers when we detect server A.
Second, we consider weighing by number of ﬂows. This
follows the same methodology as weighing by clients, but
adjustedbyﬂowsoverthedatasetdurationratherthanunique
clients.
Figure 1 compares the weighted and unweighted com-
pleteness of active and passive discovery. As described
above (Section 4.1.1), we see that passive discovery takes
some time to ﬁnd the 19% of hosts that it will ﬁnd over 12
hours. However, we see that passive monitoring ﬁnds the
most popular servers almost immediately—in fact it ﬁnds
99% of the client-weighted servers in 14 minutes, and 99%
of the ﬂow-weighted servers in 5 minutes. Thus, while pas-
sive is very poor at ﬁnding all servers, it can very rapidly ﬁnd
popular and active servers. We will see the cause of this dif-
ference when we look at server type in Section 4.4. The ser-
vices that passive misses are rarely used with default conﬁg-
urations. In fact, passive monitoring actually ﬁnds the most
popular servers faster than they would be found with active
scanning. This can been seen in Figure 1, where our active
scan takes well over an hour to ﬁnd 99% of the ﬂow- and
client-weighted servers. This difference is because it is rel-
atively slow to scan a large address space, particularly if the
scan is rate-limited to reduce the effects to normal trafﬁc, to
avoid ﬂooding hosts, or avoid triggering intrusion-detection
systems.
4.2 Server Discovery Over Time
As demonstrated in the previous section, passive moni-
toring for a short period only observes a fraction of servers.
However, active monitoring misses a few servers as well. In
the following sections we look at extended service discovery,
either through long duration passive monitoring, or through 0
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Figure 1: Weighted and unweighted cumulative server dis-
covery over 12 hours for selected services.
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Figure 2: Cumulative server discovery over 18 days, over all
and non-transient addresses
multiple rounds of active probes.
4.2.1 Effect of Duration on Passive Monitoring
In section 4.1, Figure 1 demonstrates that passive moni-
toring continues to discover servers as time progresses—this
trend suggests that a longer observation period is more effec-
tive.
To conﬁrm the beneﬁts of longer duration, we look
at server discovery over an 18-day period with dataset
DTCP1-18d to see if discovery levels off. We expect that given
sufﬁcient time, passive monitoring will detect the majority of
servers that active probing detects. Figure 2 depicts passive
server discovery over time. Separate lines depict server dis-
covery over all IP addresses and over a subset of all IPs: IPs
with non-transient addresses.
In Section 4.1 we determined that in a 12-hour period,
passive monitoring found 17% of the 1,714 servers found by
one active probe. After another 17.5 days, passive monitor-
ing detects 92.5% (1,587) of the 1,714 servers found by a
single active probe. We conclude that long-duration passive
monitoring can be very effective, although it may still fall
short of active probing.
A signiﬁcant portion of servers missed by passive mon-
itoring are servers with transient IP addresses (such as PPP
and VPN addresses). We discuss server discovery for servers
using transient IP addresses in Section 4.4.2. Here we limit
our discussion to service discovery over non-transient IP ad-
dresses.
Over all IP addresses, transient and non-transient to-
gether, passive servicediscovery never levels off. Even inthe
last ﬁve days of monitoring during DTCP1-18d, new servers
are still being discovered at an average rate of one per hour.
This continual discovery is not surprising because transient
hosts have a strong effect—every time a server with a tran-
sient IP address disconnects, there is the potential of re-
discovering this server at a new IP address the next time it
connects. Additionally, transient IP addresses can represent
many more hosts than static networks, with a variety of users
connecting and disconnecting continually.
Over non-transient hosts, host discovery nearly levels off
after 11 days but even in the last ﬁve days, new hosts are
still discovered at an average rate of one every 3 hours. We
suggest thatserver requestratesareheavy tailed, and sothere
isanumberofveryrarelyaccessedserversthatrequireavery
long time to discover.
4.2.2 Extended Duration for Passive Monitoring
In the previous section, we found that new servers con-
tinue to be discovered even after 18 days of passive monitor-
ing. In this section, we use DTCP1-90d to extend our passive
monitoring period to 90 days to see if passive server discov-
ery levels off.
Figure 3 shows cumulative server discovery over time for
all hosts, with an additional line for just servers with non-
transient IP addresses. Server discovery over non-transient
hosts drops to an average of just one newly discovered host
every 12-hours in the last ﬁve days of monitoring. In con-
trast, server discovery over all hosts only drops to roughly
one every hour and a half. Again, this difference can largely
be explained by the effect of transient hosts, which are in- 0
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Figure 3: Comparison of cumulative server discovery over
90 days and 18 days, over all and non-transient addresses
DTCP1-12h address
Passive Active categorization count
yes yes active server address 286
no yes idle server address 1,421
yes no ﬁrewalled address or birth 41
no no non-server address 14,553
Table 3: Categorization from observations of IP addresses in
DTCP1-12h.
cluded in the total. We examine transient hosts further in
Section 4.4.2.
4.2.3 Effect of Multiple Probes on Active Monitoring
Just as passive observation over a longer duration can ﬁnd
more hosts, we expect that multiple active probes will be
more effective as well.
Figure 2 shows server discovery as the number of probes
increases over 18 days. Over all scans, the majority of
servers (62%) are found in the ﬁrst scan, but the last 10 scans
still ﬁnd 10–30 new servers per scan. Similar to passive dis-
covery, this continuing increase in newly discovered servers
is due to transient hosts.
Figure 2 also shows server discovery over multiple probes
for non-transient hosts only. We observe that the number of
discovered servers roughly levels off after ﬁve scans; how-
ever, new servers appear often enough in our environment
that the last 10 scans done over the last ﬁve days each dis-
cover four servers per scan on average. This is close to the
passive discovery rate after 10 days of monitoring, imply-
ing that even over extended duration passive monitoring can
never fully catch up.
4.2.4 Completeness Over Time
Previously, for completeness, we deﬁned ground truth as
the union of a single active scan and 12 hours of passive ob-
servation. As shown in the previous section, multiple active
scans discover a larger set of hosts, as does extending the du-
ration of passive monitoring, so it is appropriate to revise the
deﬁnition of ground truth. In this section we deﬁne ground
truth as the union of all servers discovered by active and pas-
sive methods in dataset DTCP1-18d.
Though 18 days of passive monitoring may be com-
parable to a single active scan, passive monitoring, when
compared to multiple active scans is not nearly as effec-
tive. When we compare passive monitoring against 35 active
probes taken over 18 days, (summarized in the last column
of Table 2) we see that 18 days of passive monitoring detects
only 71% of all servers.
Though passive misses a signiﬁcant number of servers, as
seen during our 12-hour study in Section 4.1, passive moni-
toringﬁndsahandfulofserversbeforeactivediscoversthem,
as well as servers that are never discovered by any active
scan. As shown in the last column of Table 2, at the end of
18 days and 35 scans, 6.3% of all servers found are never
found by an active probe.
In our preliminary analysis we used Table 3 to interpret
our observations from one active probe and a short passive
observation. Table 4 extends this classiﬁcation to consider
the implications of our additional scans and monitoring; we
next look at how each group of servers from DTCP1-12h fare
with longer surveillance.
In our ﬁrst survey using DTCP-12h, 286 servers were found
by both passive and active methods. A handful of servers die
off and are never seen again by either method. Only 37 of
the original servers seen by both continue to be seen by both.
However, this group of 37 active servers are the most active
and popular servers, responsible for serving the majority of
clients and connections to our campus (Section 4.1.2). The
majority (242) of servers ﬁrst seen by both approaches are
not seen by future passive monitoring, suggesting that these
hosts are mostly idle and happened to be overheard in the
ﬁrst 12 hours of monitoring.
The largest group of detected servers in DTCP1-12h were
the 1,421 servers seen by active but not passive observation.
The majority of these servers are mostly idle servers with
ﬁxed IP addresses and 1,247 of these servers are found with
passive monitoring over extended time. A few servers (75)
are still missed by passive scans. A slightly larger number
of servers (99) are on transient addresses, explaining their
intermittent behavior.
Finally, most addresses (14,553) showed no servers
present in our initial 12-hour study. While most of these
addresses continue to not have servers (13,341), more than
1000 show activity in the longer period. We highlight two
categories here. First, we see a signiﬁcant number of new
servers, either through later passive and active, or just active.
Many of these are on transient addresses (188 detected by
both, and 655 by active only), but a fair number are on sta-
ble addresses (detected by 125 both, and 73 by active only).
Second, we see 31 possible ﬁrewalled servers on stable ad-
dresses, as indicated by their lack of response to active prob-
ing but presence of trafﬁc.
Throughout the total 18 day study, we ﬁnd 35 potentially
ﬁrewalled servers (4 from the ﬁrst 12 hours and 31 in the re-
maining time). We conﬁrm these 35 servers are running a
ﬁrewall by two methods: First, if during a single scan probes
to these services receive TCP RST packets from some ports,
but no responses from other ports, we assume the server isDTCP1-12h DTCP1 DTCP1-12h address
Passive Active Passive Active Transient categorization count
yes yes yes yes * active server address 37
yes yes no no * server death 6
yes yes yes no * intermittent 1
yes yes no yes * mostly idle 242
no yes * * yes idle/intermittent 99
no yes yes * no semi-idle 1,247
no yes no * no idle 75
yes no * * yes intermittent 26
yes no yes yes no birth 1
yes no yes no no possible ﬁrewall 4
yes no no no no death 3
yes no no yes no birth/mostly idle 7
no no no no * non-server address 13,341
no no yes yes yes intermittent/active 188
no no yes yes no birth 125
no no no yes yes intermittent/idle 655
no no no yes no birth/idle 73
no no yes no yes possible ﬁrewall/intermittent 140
no no yes no no possible ﬁrewall/birth 31
Table 4: Traits and subsequent categorization of IP addresses.
dropping probes to ﬁrewalled services and sending resets
from ports not providing services. Second, if activity to a
server is passively observed during an active scan, we as-
sume the server is available during probing, but blocking our
probes. We conﬁrmed 32 out of the 35 servers are running a
ﬁrewall with the ﬁrst method. We conﬁrmed 10 out of the 35
servers with the second method. Only one server could not
be conﬁrmed as ﬁrewall–protected.
Though ﬁrewalled services represent a small fraction of
all hosts found, as discussed in Section 4.1, context deﬁnes
how important ﬁnding these services are. Thus, if complete-
ness is the goal, a combination of both methods is beneﬁcial.
4.3 Effect of External Scans on Passive Moni-
toring
Figure 2 shows several large jumps of servers discovered
through passive monitoring (for example, at 9-20 and again
at 9-23). After examining the data, we determined that these
jumps are due to external scans of the address space—in ef-
fect, potentially malicious external parties carrying out an
active scan of the address space we monitor. These scans
beneﬁt passive monitoring by unveiling otherwise inactive
servers. We next evaluate how important these external scans
are to passive monitoring.
We expect that external scans contribute greatly to the
server discovery in passive monitoring. Unpopular or un-
used services may never be discovered without these kind of
systematic walks to the address space. We show that without
external scans, passive monitoring is signiﬁcantly hindered.
To remove the effect of external scans from DTCP1-18d,
we identify remote hosts which scan signiﬁcant portions of
the campus network during the 18 day period. We eliminate
any host which attempts to open TCP connections to 100
or more unique IP address on our network within 12 hours
and receives TCP RST responses from at least 100 of these
contacted hosts. With this method we remove the effect of
just 65 external IPs (only 0.001% of the IPs seen contact-
ing campus). However, the effect on passive monitoring is
signiﬁcant.
Figure 4 shows the difference between passive server dis-
covery with and without the use of external scans. In the
ﬁrst 12 hours, without external scans server discovery is ef-
fectively the same as server discovery with external scans.
The ﬁrst scan on 9/20 aids passive discovery to ﬁnd over 700
new servers bringing the total of discovered servers to 1,224.
Without the aid of scans, passive monitoring takes a addi-
tional 9.5 days to discover over 1,200 servers. Within three
days, passive monitoring detects over 1,300 servers. Without
scans, passive monitoring takes an additional 15 days to ﬁnd
over 1,300 servers. At the end of 18 days, passive monitoring
detects 779 (36%) fewer servers when the effect of external
scans is removed.
Given the signiﬁcant difference between discovered
servers we conclude that passive server discovery in a pro-
tected environment is not only signiﬁcantly delayed, but also
signiﬁcantly less effective.
4.4 How target type affects detection
The previous sections evaluated passive monitoring and
active probing based on their ability to detect select services
across a large set of university machines. In the following
sections
4.4.1 Server Purpose
Passive monitoring can only detect services that have ac-
tive clients. It will not ﬁnd unpopular services that are listen-
ing but never actually receive trafﬁc. If this is the only reason
services are missed by passive monitoring, servers missed by
passive monitoring are all unpopular services. We hypothe-size that many of these unpopular services are actually com-
pletely inactive and often are either accidental services from
a default system installation, or services of strictly local in-
terest, such as controls for a physical device.
It is difﬁcult to measure the popularity of a service inde-
pendent from passive monitoring; by deﬁnition we see pop-
ular services, and we have no way of evaluating how unpop-
ular those that are missed are. However, for the special case
of web servers, the content is usually humanly readable, so
we can manually evaluate the content of the web server.
To evaluate the content of discovered web servers, we ﬁrst
download root web pages from all web servers discovered
during the 18 days in dataset DTCP1-18d. Each web server is
contacted within a day of discovery.
We then categorize these root web pages into seven cat-
egories: custom content (content that is unique and likely
is globally interesting), default content (such as the Apache
server test page), minimal content (fewer than 100 bytes),
device conﬁguration/status pages (such as JetDirect printer
pages), database interface pages (such as Oracle database
front-ends), pages with restricted content (log in pages) and
hosts which did not respond. To categorize web pages we de-
veloped a set of 185 web page signatures, which contain sets
of strings commonly found in speciﬁc types of web pages.
Forexample, oneofour“defaultcontent”signaturesmatches
14 different strings often found in the default Apache web
server page.
We expect that passive monitoring has no problem ﬁnd-
ing web servers serving globally interesting content (custom
content). Additionally, we expect that pages missed by pas-
sive monitoring fall into a less interesting categories such as
“default content”.
It is impossible to determine the global interest for con-
ﬁguration pages database front-ends and pages with log in
access without speciﬁc knowledge of their use within the or-
ganization, While we suspect many of these pages are in-
tended only for campus use, there may be a set of external
users accessing these documents.
Table 5 summarizes the web content of the root pages.
Passive monitoring achieves the best completeness for cus-
tom content pages ﬁnding all custom content servers.
Passive monitoring ﬁnds a surprising number of web
servers hosting non-globally interesting content, ﬁnding
95% of the union. This is contrary to what we expected;
however, if we remove web servers only found through ex-
ternal scans, passive monitoring ﬁnds only 69% of the 504
web servers identiﬁed as serving non-interesting content.
There are a large number of servers (685 servers) which
did not respond a day after they were initially discovered.
The vast majority of these servers have transient IP ad-
dresses, and are possibly unintentional default web servers
on dial-up machines, or potentially intentional web servers
on machines with stable IP addresses, but their web server is
found by active probing the host’s VPN interface.
4.4.2 Transient Hosts
We next consider transient hosts—hosts which change IP
addresses, or which are often turned on and off.
We expect that passive monitoring will out perform active
probing in server discovery when looking at transient hosts
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Figure 4: Cumulative server discovery with and without the
effect of external network scans.
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Figure 5: Server discovery grouped by transience of address
block.
since active probing may miss hosts that come and go. On
the other hand, we expect relatively few active services to
run on transient hosts, since just as transience make them
difﬁcult for an active scan to ﬁnd, it also makes them difﬁcult
for clients to ﬁnd.
To evaluate this hypothesis, we compute service discov-
ery for IP addresses that we know correspond to transient
hosts. Our dataset is drawn from a large campus network
with known blocks of addresses allocated to VPN, PPP,
Wireless and DHCP hosts. Of the 16,130 addresses, 2,296
of them correspond to transient blocks (one /22 campus
DHCP; two /23s, DHCP and wireless; and one /24 subnet,
for VPNs); we call this subset DTCP1-18d-trans. We then com-
pare the server discovery between active probing and passive
monitoring over this subset.
Figure 5 shows server discovery over time for both pas-
sive monitoring and active probing, grouped by different ad-
dress space classes. Ground truth is deﬁned by the union of
passive and active discovery of each service type. We omitTotal Passive Active OR Passive Active Passive
Page type (Union) AND Active Active only Passive only
Custom content 170 (100%) 151 (89%) 0 (0.0%) 19 (11%) 151 (89%) 170 (100%)
Not globally interesting 504 (100%) 479 (95%) 23 (4.5%) 2 (0.39%) 502 (100%) 481 (95%)
Default content 493 469 22 2 491 471
Minimal content 11 10 1 0 11 10
Unknown 1,446 (100%) 798 (55%) 474 (33%) 174 (12%) 1,272 (88%) 972 (67%)
Conﬁg/status pages 683 212 327 144 539 356
Database interface 61 61 0 0 61 61
Restricted content 17 17 0 0 17 17
No response 685 508 147 30 655 538
Table 5: Summary of content served by web servers detected.
wireless from this graph, since unfortunately we were not
able to actively probe the wireless address range. In addi-
tion, passive monitoring found no services in the wireless
region.
Overall, DTCP1-18d-trans conﬁrms the relative perfor-
mance of active and passive monitoring. Active probing usu-
ally discovers more hosts than passive monitoring, except for
the PPP subset where they are relatively close. This result is
perhaps not surprising for transient hosts since there is likely
to be relatively few active users of services that come and go.
However, our analysis of transient address is interest-
ing because different kinds of transient address space show
somewhat different results. The data for DHCP addresses
is most similar to our general results. This similarity can be
explained because the majority the DHCP addresses are ded-
icated to Residence Halls, with an allocation policy where
each student keeps the same IP for a full semester or more.
However, for PPP addresses, passive discovery ﬁnds about
15% more servers than active. We speculate that this inver-
sion is because PPP hosts are typically active only for short
periods of time.
Another signiﬁcant difference is monitoring VPN ad-
dresses, where passive discovery ﬁnds almost no services
(10 after 18 days), while active ﬁnds many (nearly 100 in
the same time). A possible explanation for this is that VPN
hosts often have two IP addresses, one that corresponds to
VPN access and another that is direct access to the Internet.
While active service discovery suggests that many of these
hosts run services, passive discovery says that the VPN ad-
dress is very rarely used. We speculate that users of services
on these hosts are typically using the non-VPN address.
Finally, our focus on transient hosts suggests that address
transience is a major cause of service birth and death. We
reach this conclusion because, in Figure 5, server discovery
does not level off. However, because actual hosts-to-address
mappings are transient, this discovery may represent a small
number of hosts simply moving to different addresses rather
than a large number of actual hosts. If that were the case, we
would expect server discover to converge when all transient
addresses were marked as servers. While address reassign-
ment may account for some server births, it does not account
for all. When we compare server discover with and without
transient hosts in Figure 2. We review this question when we
consider very long passive monitoring in Section 4.2.2.
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Figure 6: Server discovery over time for passive monitoring
and active probing, broken down by protocol.
4.4.3 Protocols
The previous section we looked at how address stability
affects server discovery. In this section we look to what how
different services and service types affect server discovery.
We expect that different services are used in different ways
and so may be available to different degrees. For example, an
SSH service may be ﬁrewall protected since it’s a secure ser-
vice provided to a limited number of users, whereas a web-
server typically has a more global audience and will not be
ﬁrewall protected.
To evaluate the effects of service type, we return to
DTCP1-18d, but break out server discovery by different server
types. We consider four services: Web, FTP, SSH and
MySQL.
Figure 6 shows server discovery over time for both pas-
sive and active probing for these speciﬁc services, and Ta-
ble 6 summarizes server discovery. Ground truth is the union
of active and passive discovery in DTCP1-18d.
The results for speciﬁc services conﬁrm our overall con-
clusion that active probing discovers more servers than pas-
sive monitoring.
Passive monitoring discovers particularly few MySQL
servers, achieving only 52% completeness, while activeTotal Passive Active OR Passive Active Passive
Service (Union) AND Active Active only Passive only (non exclusive)
Web 2,120 (100%) 1,428 (67%) 497 (23%) 195 (9.2%) 1,925 (91%) 1,623 (77%)
FTP 815 (100%) 566 (68%) 241 (30%) 8 (1.0%) 807 (99%) 574 (70%)
SSH 925 (100%) 701 (76%) 221 (24%) 3 (3.2%) 922 (100%) 704 (76%)
MySQL 164 (100%) 78 (48%) 79 (48%) 7 (4.2%) 157 (96%) 85 (52%)
Table 6: Summary of server discovery broken down by service type.
scans reach 96% completeness. We suspect that the major-
ity of MySQL servers on campus are used locally, with little
external access, or external access only through web inter-
faces. In Figure 6 the stepped and sudden increases in pas-
sive MySQL server discovery indicate MySQL servers are
probed from external sources, yet interestingly, these scans
are not nearly as helpful in passive service discovery as for
other services. Upon inspection of our passive and active
data, we ﬁnd that 63 out of the 79 MySQL servers missed
by passive responded to our campus probes on 9/29, just af-
ter a large external scan probed the campus address space
for MySQL servers. Though these 63 MySQL servers were
probed, we observed no responses. Potentially, these missed
MySQL servers block probes from external sources, but still
respond to our internal active probes, hindering passive dis-
covery from our monitoring point, but enabling active dis-
covery.
WhileactiveprobingﬁndsnearlyallFTPandSSHservers
(99% and 100% respectively), passive monitoring ﬁnds sig-
niﬁcantly fewer. This suggests that many of these servers
exist but that they are infrequently used. For FTP, this result
consistent with HTTP replacing FTP as the primary means
of data dissemination. We presume that FTP servers are
primarily legacy servers. For SSH, this result is consistent
with a workstation model of use, where nearly all hosts are
available for remote access via SSH, but that protocol is used
primarily for maintenance, while most workstation access is
direct at the console.
These results are dependent on the particular services we
examined. While we expect our basic results to hold for
other general well-known services, we speculate that proto-
cols such as peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing may be different since
they are known to have a much higher server turnover rate
(churn) [4].
4.5 Discovery of UDP Services
The majority of this paper considers only discovery of
TCP services because the TCP connection setup makes them
easy to discover. In this section we broaden our view to con-
sider UDP service discovery with both active probing and
passive monitoring.
We consider four selected UDP services: port 80 (HTTP
and other applications), 53 (DNS), 137 (Microsoft Windows
NetBIOS Name Service), and 27015 (common multiplayer
game port). Dataset DUDP collects 24 hours of passive mon-
itoring and one active scan, both only considering the pri-
mary /16 network at USC. The active probes are not cus-
tomized to an expected application, in other words, we use
generic UDP probing for active host discovery. Our passive
monitoring considers any packets with the above destination
ports as indicating the presence of the corresponding service
on that host.
Generic UDP probing is difﬁcult because there is no
generic positive response for service present. We therefore
interpret only an ICMP port unreachable as a true negative
response and a UDP reply a true positive response. If a host
responds to some probes and not to others, we know the host
is alive, and can then consider a lack of response as sug-
gesting a possibly open service. We are able to make this
ﬁnal conclusion on the assumption that we did not generate
a proper application-speciﬁc request, but most kernels gen-
erate negative ICMP responses when no service is present.
Finally, if no ports solicit an explicit response (either posi-
tive or negative), we assume no host is present. (Nmap con-
tains support for service-speciﬁc probing, however, we were
not allowed to use that service due to potential privacy con-
cerns.) We expect active probing to perform well at detect-
ing DNS and NetBIOS name servers because these two pro-
tocolsarecommonandtheseserversoftenrespondtogeneric
UDP probes.
Table 7 summarizes services discovered by passive moni-
toring and active probing. Of the 37 servers found by passive
monitoring only one was not found by active probing, indi-
cating that considering any trafﬁc from these selected ports
to conﬁrm the presence of a server obtains accurate, but not
complete, results.
The vast majority of hosts indicated as possible UDP
servers by active probing sent no response to external
sources. Given the prevalence of Microsoft Windows Op-
erating Systems which use the peer-to-peer NetBIOS name
server protocol, it is not surprising that a large number of
hosts on campus have port 137 open. We observe only 37
UDP servers on the NetBIOS port. Though NetBIOS has
the potential to generate a signiﬁcant amount of trafﬁc, un-
dernormalcircumstances, NetBIOStrafﬁcdoesnottypically
cross border routers.
5 Sensitivity
Section 4 presented the general results of our work, but
deployment of either passive or active measurement requires
understanding of a number of parameters, including when
and how frequently to perform active probes and complete-
ness of passive observation. We evaluate these factors here
to understand their effect on our general results.
5.1 Time and Frequency of Active Probing
Our results in Section 4 based on active probing rely on
probes done periodically at set intervals. In this section
we explore how the time of day and the frequency of these
probes affects active probing service discovery.service All Web DNS NetBIOS Gaming
port 80 53 137 27015
Passive 37 0 32 4 1
Active
deﬁnitely open (UDP response) 116 0 52 64 0
possibly open 4,862 137 376 4,238 111
no response from any probed port 6,359 - - - -
deﬁnitely closed (ICMP response) 9,826 9,687 9,449 5,572 9,713
Table 7: Summary of UDP services discovered.
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Figure 7: Comparison of network scanning at different times
of day.
In datasets DTCP1-18d and DTCPbreak, active probes occur
every 12 hours. Each scan started daily at 11am and then
again at 11pm and took 90–120 minutes to cover the address
space. We expect that the time these probes were done di-
rectly affects the number of servers discovered.
To evaluate the effect of probe time-of-day we re-examine
DTCP1-18d. WetakethefullDTCP1-18d, withbothpassiveand
active discovery, as ground truth. We compare three time-of-
day dependent subsets against this baseline. First, we select
the 17 probes taken every 24 hours in the daytime (11am)
or at night (11pm). While these subsets capture time-of-day
dependence, they also have the scan frequency and so are not
directly comparable to the 35-probe dataset. We therefore
also consider a third subset where we take alternative day
and night measurements from each consecutive day to get an
unbiased mix of 17 day and night observations.
Figure 7 shows cumulative server discovery over multiple
probes for the baseline and three subsets.
We ﬁrst evaluate time-of-day dependence, looking at the
completeness scanning at night and during the day achieves.
Though the difference is small, scanning during the day is
marginally more effective than scanning at night, reducing
completeness by 3%. This is not surprising since we ex-
pect that there are more transient hosts with active services
available during the day. While scanning at night ﬁnds 232
servers not found by scanning during the day, scanning dur-
ing the day ﬁnds 325 not found at night. These differences
strongly suggest that host discovery done every 24-hours is
affected by diurnal patterns.
The shortfall of probing once a day may be due to the use
of fewer probes. When we compare alternative probes at day
and night, we can keep 17 probes as in day- or night-only, but
factor out the time of day. In this case we see performance
like day-only probing. This result suggests that number of
probes is more important than capturing day-only or night-
only servers. Ultimately, by reducing the probe frequency
we reduce our completeness by 8% after 18 days.
5.2 Partial Perspectives in Passive Monitoring
Ideally passive monitoring sees all trafﬁc out of the mon-
itored network. However, this complete viewpoint may be
difﬁcult with multi-homed sites. In this section we evaluate
how less than complete observation of the monitored net-
work affects accuracy.
To evaluate partial observation of a network we would
like to compare full and partial observation. However, as de-
scribed in Section 3.2, our passive monitoring infrastructure
captures only part of data to and from USC. Our university
connects to the Internet through a regional network that has
three peerings with commercial ISPs; in addition we have
an Internet2 connection. For most of our datasets we moni-
tor two of the three commercial peerings of our university’s
regional network, and estimate we capture 99% of all univer-
sity trafﬁc not destined to Internet2. For dataset DTCPbreak,
we also monitored our university’s Internet2 peering.
While we cannot compare a complete view of trafﬁc to a
partial view, we can look at how subsets of our observation
affect completeness of our results.
Table 8 summarizes the number of servers found from
each peering (and possibly on other peerings) as well as
the number of servers found exclusively on a speciﬁc peer-
ing. We see that any single link commercial observes
most servers, ﬁnding 90–98% in DTCP1-18d and 93–99% in
DTCPbreak. The Internet2 link is an exception, observing
only about 36% of the servers in DTCPbreak. This differ-
ence is likely due to Internet2’s academic-only acceptable-
use policy that limits the set of clients that access our univer-
sity through this link.
While any single link gets most of the servers, we do ob-
serve a small number of servers that are exclusive to each
link. We believe these represent rarely used servers; if they
are only contacted a few times then it is not unlikely that all
connections occur over a single peering.
From this evaluation we conclude that partial monitoring
does not greatly affect results provided one can observe aservers found in
DTCP1-18d DTCPbreak
link duplicative exclusive duplicative exclusive
Commercial 1 1,874 (89%) 201 (9.5%) 1,770 (96%) 59 (3.2%)
Commercial 2 ” 39 (1.8%) 1,711 (93%) 1(.05%)
Internet2 — — 669 (36%) 3 (.16%)
all 2,111 — 1,835 —
Table 8: Summary of servers found on each of the three monitored links.
substantial fraction of the trafﬁc, and the observation site is
not limited by a restrictive policies. While we cannot con-
ﬁrm how many servers a complete observation of our net-
work would have added during DTCP1-18d, this subset anal-
ysis suggests addition of the Internet2 link during our initial
study would not have signiﬁcantly changed our observations
and would not change our conclusions.
5.3 Passive Monitoring with Sampled Obser-
vations
Our observation system is able to collect and process
a complete trace because our link speeds are fairly low
(1Gb/s), we only collect packet headers (64B/packet), and
we only process TCP packets with SYN-ACK ﬂags set.
However, passive monitoring becomes hard at very high bi-
trates, such as a 10Gb/s link speed or shifting to deeper
packet inspection. An alternative to collecting a complete
packet header trace is to sample packet headers and observe
only a fraction of the trafﬁc on a link. In this section we ex-
plore the effect of using various sampling durations on ser-
vice discovery in passive monitoring.
There are several possible approaches to sampling: ob-
serving and then idling for a ﬁxed period of time, collecting
a ﬁxed number of packet headers and then idling, or collect-
ing each packet header with some (non-unity) probability.
These approaches are increasingly amenable to higher speed
or hardware realizations. Here we consider only sampling
for ﬁxed durations; evaluation of other kinds of sampling is
left as future work.
We return to dataset DTCP1-18d to evaluate the effects of
ﬁxed-period sampling. In Figure 8 we sample data from the
ﬁrst 2, 5, 10 and 30 minutes of each hour (3%, 8%, 16%,
and 50% of the data, respectively) and compare how each
sample duration affects service discovery throughout the 18
day trace period. As in previous sections, we deﬁne ground
truth as the union of servers found both passively and ac-
tively throughout the full dataset DTCP1-18d, then evaluate
sampled data for completeness against this ground truth.
As expected, capturing a greater portion of the data pro-
vides a closer match to a complete observation. However, the
relationship between sampling and coverage is not linear—
capturing only 50% of the data does not require doubling the
observation period to get the same results. In fact, sampling
at 30 minute durations is almost as effective as monitoring
continuously, with only a 5% drop in the number of servers
discovered over 18 days. Capturing only 16% of the data
results only in an 11% drop in discovered servers.
The relationship between sampling duration and cumula-
tive discovered servers is not directly proportional primarily
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Figure 8: Cumulative server discovery with different dura-
tion, ﬁxed-period sampling.
because of the effect of external scans. As described in Sec-
tion 4.3, external scans are important to the completeness of
passive monitoring. Since scans are often rapid but short,
whether or not a scan is caught in sampled observation af-
fects the coverage of that observation. Full and 30-minute
samples both are greatly aided by scans on 9-20 in Figure 8,
while the servers found in this scan are likely found by a
different scan on 9-22 for the 5- and 10-minute samples.
5.4 Other Protocols
Throughout Section 4 our observations focus on dis-
covery of ﬁve speciﬁc services (ftp, ssh, http, https, and
MySQL). In this section we expanding service discovery to
consider services running on any port.
To evaluate service discovery over all ports, we use
dataset DTCPall, which includes active probe and passive
monitoring of all ports from a single /24 subnet of ﬁxed IP
addresses. The majority of hosts on this subnet are student
lab machines. This data includes a single active scan (due
to privacy concerns about repeatedly scanning all ports), and
ten days ofpassive monitoring. Asdone inprevious sections,
we deﬁne ground truth as the union of servers found actively
and passively.
We expect that passive discovery will not detect as many
servers as active discovery, but will ﬁnd popular and active
services more rapidly than active discovery (as we saw pre-
viously in Section 4.1). We also expect to see passive server
discovery boosted by external scans (as we saw previouslyPassive, unweighted server discovery
Passive, weighted by flows
Passive, weighted by clients
Active, unweighted server discovery
Active, weighted by flows
Active, weighted by clients
Figure 9: Weighted and unweighted cumulative server dis-
covery over 24 hours for services.
in Section 4.3).
Expanding our study to all ports increases the variety of
service types we discover. The range of possible services
meanstherearemoreservicesthatonlyonemethodwillﬁnd.
For example, an RPC service can be discovered passively,
but not by generic active probing. Idle and local services
such as Windows File Sharing can be discovered by generic
active probing, but will likely not be found passively. Due
to this range of services, we expect a smaller intersection of
services discovered by passive and active methods.
Figure 9 compares active and passive methods over 24
hours for weighted server discovery as described in Sec-
tion 4.1 and unweighted server discovery. While our initial
study of completeness in Section 4.1 covered 12 hours, in
this section we look at a 24 hour period because the network
scan took nearly 24 hours to complete (we expect that this
process would be much faster if host scanning eliminated
probes of unpopulated addresses, but we omit this optimiza-
tion as in our other scans).
As seen in our study of selected ports (Section 4.1), pas-
sive monitoring quickly discovers popular and active servers.
Ofthe250hostswhichrespondedinsomewaytoourprobes,
one host in particular is responsible for 97% of the connec-
tions seen coming into the monitored subnet, and responsi-
ble for serving 97% of the external clients of the subnet. In
Figure 9, active server discovery of weighted servers jumps
when this single popular server is found just before 12:30. In
this case, when scanning a single subset of machines where
a single server dominates the network, it is by chance that
passive still ﬁnds the single most popular server ﬁrst. Had
the most popular server been probed before all other hosts,
active may have found the server before it was discovered by
passive monitoring. However, in larger networks, with mul-
tiple popular and active servers spread across subnets, it is
highly unlikely active probing can ﬁnd the most active and
popular servers more rapidly than passive monitoring.
In Figure 9, we can also see that passive monitoring is
again aided by external scans, where the majority of servers
passively found are found during an external scan just after
Passive server discovery
Active server discovery
Figure 10: Cumulative server discovery over 10 days over all
known ports.
12:30. Figure 10 extends the passive monitoring in Figure 9
from one day to all ten days in DTCPall . In Section 4.2.1,
we saw that over multiple days, external scans continue to
help passive monitoring discover servers and within 10 days,
passive discovery found 89% of the servers found by the ﬁrst
active scan in dataset DTCP1-18d. However, in this study we
see that passive discovery tops out after four days, ﬁnding
131 servers, slightly over 50% of the union of all servers
found.
To understand why passive discovery appears to perform
worse over all services than our ﬁve ports, we explore dis-
covery by port number. In Figure 11, each spot on the x-axis
corresponds to a unique host address (randomly assigned to
preserve privacy). The y-axis shows which TCP ports are
shown to be open, plotted on a split scale graph to empha-
size the commonly used low-numbered ports. While iden-
tifying services based solely on port number is not always
appropriate (as we discuss in Section 2.1), the very homo-
geneous population of lab machines in DTCPall allows us to
make likely service assignment for ports with common static
assignments. These service assignments are labeled in Fig-
ure 11.
From Figure 11, we can see passive discovery ﬁnds all
of the SSH and FTP servers. Discovery of these two ser-
vices is nearly entirely due to two separate external scans.
Passive discovery misses a large number of servers running
Microsoft Windows NT, including NT-speciﬁc services such
as epmap (their RPC mapping service). It is not surprising
that passive misses these NT servers since these services are
primarily used for local services, not for wide-area services
that would show up in trafﬁc to external networks.
Passive discovery ﬁnds a few services missed by active
discovery, including six web servers. Active probes to port
80 on these new web servers reported closed, not ﬁltered, but
later passive found active servers on port 80; hence, these
web servers appear to be births of active servers which hap-
pened after the active scan ﬁnished on August 26th. The few
open ports with high port numbers found by passive monitor-
ing may be more ephemeral services, such as a P2P applica-10
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Figure 11: Scatter plot of open ports in DTCPall.
tions, or they could be temporarily open ports which are not
an actual service, such as an FTP client using active mode to
transfer data.
Passive discovery is at a disadvantage when ﬁnding hosts
offering services which have limited external appeal. When
we look at services on any port, such as remote X11 and
Microsoft’s NT epmap this disadvantage is more pronounced
then when we looked at a small subset of ports.
5.5 Reduction in Numbers of Students
In this section we look at how a decrease in students af-
fects our results by studying service discovery during winter
break when our student population is greatly reduced.
The datasets used in Section 4 were collected during mid-
semester, when classes were in session and students were
present. For this study, we use DTCPbreak, collected during
winter break, when the majority of students are away from
campus. During break we have data collected from Inter-
net2 as well as from the two commercial taps used to collect
DTCP1. To make our results from DTCPbreak comparable to
results from DTCP1, we exclude hosts discovered solely on
Internet2. We look at how adding monitoring of Internet2
affects our results in Section 5.2. We deﬁne ground truth
as all servers discovered throughout DTCPbreak, discarding
servers discovered exclusively by monitoring Internet2 traf-
ﬁc.
Similar to our graph of server discovery over 18 days
(Figure 2 in Section 4.2.1), Figure 12 depicts server dis-
covery for both active and passive methods over 11 days
during winter break. In Figure 12, we can see that both
passive and active discovery over all hosts levels off dur-
ing break. This leveling off is different from what we see
during the semester, where servers are continually discov-
ered, even after 18 days. The reason for this difference is
a large reduction in the number of servers with transient IP
addresses. In particular, there is a signiﬁcant drop in VPN
servers. From December 23rd through December 26th only
three VPN servers are discovered (all three by active prob-
ing). We believe this large reduction in transient servers is
because fewer students were actively working during break,
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Figure 12: Cumulative server discovery over 11 days during
winter break.
and thus fewer students needed to VPN into the campus net-
work, use dial-up connections to get PPP addresses, or plug
their laptop into the dorm networks for a dynamically as-
signed address.
The reduction in transient hosts during break means that
over all hosts, passive discovery achieves a signiﬁcantly
higher completeness during break than during the semester.
Within 11 days, passive discovery achieves an 82% com-
pleteness over all hosts in DTCPbreak. By comparison, during
the semester passive discovery achieved a 73% completeness
within the ﬁrst 11 days of DTCP1-18d.
Over non-transient hosts, we see similar results between
theﬁrst11daysinDTCP1-18d andDTCPbreak. Within11days,
active discovery achieves a 96% completeness during the
semester and a 97% completeness during break. Passive dis-
coveryachievesa90%completenessduringthesemesterand
a 91% completeness during break for non-transient hosts.
From this comparison we conclude that presence or ab-
sence of populations using transient addresses signiﬁcantly
affects the completeness of passive service discovery.
6 Related Work
Beyond qualitative evaluations in trade publications [16],
there has been little evaluation of passive service discovery
in the research community and even less comparing passive
methods to periodic active scans for service discovery.
Closest to our work is Webster et al. [20], where they pas-
sively monitored 800 workstations and servers located in a
network demilitarized zone (DMZ). for a period of 86 days.
All 800 hosts were actively probed twice: once ten days be-
fore the beginning of the passive study and once more at
the end. Our work was independently developed and dif-
fers in many ways. We perform multiple active probes peri-
odically during passive monitoring. Our host population is
much larger and much more diverse, including transient and
dynamic hosts. Thus our study includes many additional di-
mensions such as the effectiveness of active discovery over
multiple scans initiated over different time of day, the ef-
fectiveness of both passive/active techniques for discoveringservices on transient and dynamic hosts, and the uninten-
tional effects of external scans. Our study also covers addi-
tional metrics for measuring completeness, including a pop-
ularity metric derived independently from passive measure-
ments, and the effects of sampling on passive monitoring.
There has been considerable interest in passive monitor-
ing, leading to a number of widely used tools. De Montigny-
Leboeuf et al. discuss how a variety of information can be
obtained through passive monitoring and how this informa-
tion can be used to aid in policy enforcement and intrusion
detection [13]. Tools such as P0f (Passive OS Fingerprint-
ing) rely on examination of packet content (although they
can also be used in active mode). Intrusion detection sys-
tems such as Bro [14] and Snort [3] rely mostly on pas-
sive monitoring to maintain situation awareness. Dayioglu et
al. discuss how intrusion detection systems can beneﬁt from
using a hybrid approach of both active and passive meth-
ods [6]. Examples of hybrid approaches include Prelude, a
hybrid IDS framework that combines a large number of other
tools (e.g., Snort and Nessus), and Ettercap, a suite of attack
tools for man-in-the-middle attacks. This work offers im-
portant insight into the power of passive monitoring, and our
approach could beneﬁt from their sometimes more sophisti-
cated forms of monitoring. However, our work adds to this
work a quantitative comparison between passive and active
methods.
For our work we used Nmap [2] to perform active prob-
ing, but there are a number of other network scanning tools
available. Popular scanners such as Nessus [1], offer a large
number of tools to assess services and identify speciﬁc vul-
nerabilities in a network. Though all of these tools, including
Nmap, offer optimizations and vulnerability identiﬁcation
not studied in this paper, the core principle of active prob-
ing remains the same and our work can capitalize on better
methods of active probing as they become available. Our
work complements these tools, however, by indicating cases
that passive monitoring can miss, such as transient hosts.
Very recent work has used random, active probing of In-
ternet addresses to characterize the deep, database-driven
web [9]. Their approach is similar our approach at server
categorization in Section 4.4.1. Their goals are quite differ-
ent than ours, and so they make a much more careful exam-
ination of the websites of interest, and undertake a random
survey of the entire Internet. We, instead, consider only the
root web page of the server, and focus only on servers at our
institution. Our use of passive and active approaches com-
plement theirs, and passive monitoring allow them to ﬁnd
popular deep websites (see Section 4.1.2).
Finally, passive monitoring has been widely used for traf-
ﬁc analysis and modeling (some examples include trafﬁc en-
gineering [7], web [17] and peer-to-peer [8] workloads, and
model parametrization [12]). Our work differs from this
work in that we explore service discovery rather than mod-
eling or analysis of a particular service’s trafﬁc. Our passive
monitoring shares with this work the same set of questions
about completeness when monitoring is only partial.
7 Conclusions
Service discovery is vital for protecting and adminis-
trating networks across organizational boundaries, as well
as monitoring and researching growth trends. Often, con-
straints such as time and privacy concerns, limit the fre-
quency of active scans and/or the duration of passive mon-
itoring, and it is important to understand how these con-
straints affect results. In this paper, we quantiﬁed a variety
of factors that directly impact passive and active service dis-
covery.
We have shown that passive and active service discov-
ery are complimentary methods for discovering services on
a network. While active discovery ﬁnds servers without re-
lying on client activity, it misses services not available at the
time of probing and those which actively block probes. Pas-
sive discovery quickly ﬁnds very popular services, even if
these services are protected by ﬁrewalls. Over time, passive
discovery is able to ﬁnd intermittent and protected services
that are missed by active probing. Interestingly, this process
is greatly aided by external, potentially malicious scans.
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